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Abstract
We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning
in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and
non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we coin “fast and furious” learning in games,
sets a new benchmark about what is possible both in max-min optimization as well as in multi-
agent systems. Our analysis does not depend on introducing a carefully tailored dynamic.
Instead we focus on the most well studied online dynamic, gradient descent. Similarly, we
focus on the simplest textbook class of games, two-agent two-strategy zero-sum games, such
as Matching Pennies. Even for this simplest of benchmarks the best known bound for total
regret, prior to our work, was the trivial one of O(T ), which is immediately applicable even to
a non-learning agent. Based on a tight understanding of the geometry of the non-equilibrating
trajectories in the dual space we prove a regret bound of Θ(
√
T ) matching the well known
optimal bound for adaptive step sizes in the online setting. This guarantee holds for all fixed
step-sizes without having to know the time horizon in advance and adapt the fixed step-size
accordingly. As a corollary, we establish that even with fixed learning rates the time-average of
mixed strategies, utilities converge to their exact Nash equilibrium values.
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Figure 1: 5000 Iterations of Gradient Descent on Matching Pennies with η = .15.
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1 Introduction
The performance of online learning algorithms such as online gradient descent in adversarial, adap-
tive settings is a classic staple of optimization and game theory, e.g, [10, 17, 37]. Arguably, the
most well known results in this space are the following:
i) Sublinear regret of O(
√
T ) is achievable in adversarial settings but only after employing a
carefully chosen sequence of shrinking step-sizes or if the time horizon is finite and known in
advance and the fixed learning rate is selected accordingly.
ii) Sublinear regret algorithms “converge” to Nash equilibria in zero-sum games.
Despite the well established nature of these results recent work has revealed some surprising
insights that come to challenge the traditional ways of thinking in this area. Specifically, in the case
of zero-sum games what is referred to as “convergence” to equilibrium, is the fact that when both
agent apply regret-minimizing algorithms, both the time-average of the mixed strategy profiles as
well as the utilities of the agents converge approximately to their Nash equilibrium values, where
the approximation error can become arbitrarily close to zero by choosing a sufficiently small step-
size. Naturally, this statement does not imply that the day-to-day behavior converges to equilibria.
In fact, the actual realized behavior is antithetical to convergence to equilibrium. [1] showed that
Nash equilibria are repelling in zero-sum games for all follow-the-regularized-leader dynamics. As
seen in Figure 1 the dynamics spiral outwards away from the equilibrium.
These novel insights about the geometry of learning dynamics in zero-sum games suggest a
much richer and not well understood landscape of coupled strategic behaviors. They also raise
the tantalizing possibility that we may be able to leverage this knowledge to prove tighter regret
bounds in games. In fact, a series of recent papers has focused on beating the “black-box” regret
bounds using a combination of tailored dynamics and adaptive step-sizes, e.g, [12, 30, 33, 16] but
so far no new bounds have been proven for the classic setting of fixed learning rates. Interestingly,
[16] explicitly examine the case of fixed learning rates η to show that learning achieves sublinear
“approximate regret” where the algorithm compares itself against (1 − η) times the performance
of the best action with hindsight. In contrast, our aim is to show sublinear regret for fixed η using
the standard notion of regret.
Intuitively, non-equilibration and more generally this emergent behavioral complexity seem like
harbingers of bad news in terms of system performance as well as of significant analytical obstacles.
This pessimism seems especially justified given recent results about the behavior of online dynamics
with fixed step-sizes in other small games (e.g. two-by-two coordination/congestion games), where
their behavior can be shown to become provably chaotic ([25, 11]). Nevertheless, we show that
we can leverage this geometric information to provide the first to our knowledge sublinear regret
guarantees for online gradient descent with fixed step-size in games. Instability of Nash equilibria
is not an obstacle, but in fact may be leveraged as a tool, for proving low regret.
Our results. We study the dynamics of gradient descent with fixed step size in two-strategy,
two-player games. We leverage a deep understanding of the geometry of its orbits to prove the first
sublinear regret bounds despite the constant learning rate. We show that the player strategies are
repelled away from the Nash equilibrium. More specifically, regardless of the choice of the initial
condition there are only a finite number of iterations where both players select mixed strategies
(Theorem 1). We prove a worst-case regret bound of O(
√
T ) for arbitrarily learning without
prior knowledge of T (Theorem 3) matching the well known optimal bound for adaptive learning
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rates. An immediate corollary of our results is that time-average of the mixed strategy profiles
as well as the utilities of the agents converge to their exact Nash equilibrium values (and not
to approximations thereof) (Corollary 4). Finally, we present a matching lower bound of Ω(
√
T )
(Theorem 5) establishing that our regret analysis is tight.
To obtain the upper bound, we establish a tight understanding of the geometry of the trajec-
tories in the dual space, i.e., the trajectories of the payoff vectors. We show there exists a linear
transformation of the payoff vectors that rotate around the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the dis-
tance between the Nash equilibrium and these transformed utility vectors increases by a constant
in each rotation (Lemma 8). In addition, the time to complete a rotation is proportional to the
distance between the Nash equilibrium and the transformed payoff vectors (Lemma 9). Together,
these results imply a quadratic relationship between the number of iterations and the number of
rotations completed establishing the O(
√
T ) regret bound. We establish the lower bound by exactly
tracking the strategies and regret for a single game.
2 Preliminaries
A two-player game consists of two players {1, 2} where each player has ni strategies to select from.
Player i can either select a pure strategy j ∈ [ni] or a mixed strategy xi ∈ Xi = {xi ∈ Rni≥0 :∑
j∈[ni] xij = 1}. A strategy is fully mixed if xi ∈ Rni>0.
The most commonly studied class of games is zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game, there is
a payoff matrix A ∈ Rn1×n2 where player 1 receives utility x1 · Ax2 and player 2 receives utility
−x1 ·Ax2 resulting in the following optimization problem:
max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
x1 ·Ax2 (Two-Player Zero-Sum Game)
The solution to this saddle problem is the Nash equilibrium xNE . If player 1 selects her Nash
equilibria xNE1 , then she guarantees her utility is x
NE
1 · Ax2 ≥ xNE1 · AxNE2 independent of what
strategy player 2 selects. xNE1 ·AxNE2 is referred to as the value of the game.
2.1 Online Learning in Continuous Time
In many applications of game theory, players know neither the payoff matrix nor the Nash equilibria.
In such settings, players select their strategies adaptively. The most common way to do this in
continuous time is by using a follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) algorithm. Given a strongly
convex regularizer, a learning rate η, and an initial payoff vector yi(0), players select their strategies
at time T according to
y1(T ) = y1(0) +
∫ T
0
Ax2(t)dt (Player 1 Payoff Vector)
y2(T ) = y2(0)−
∫ T
0
Aᵀx1(t)dt (Player 2 Payoff Vector)
xi(T ) = arg max
xi≥0:
∑
j∈[ni] xij=1
{
yi(T ) · xi − hi(xi)
η
}
(Continuous FTRL)
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the regularizer hi(xi) = ||xi||22/2 resulting in the
Gradient Descent algorithm:
xi(t) = arg max
xi≥0:
∑
j∈[ni] xij=1
{
yi(t) · xi − ||xi||
2
2
2η
}
(Continuous Gradient Descent)
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Continuous time FTRL learning in games has an interesting number of properties including time-
average converge to the set of coarse correlated equilibria at a rate of O(1/T ) in general games
[21] and thus to Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. These systems can also exhibit interesting
recurrent behavior e.g. periodicity [28, 23], Poincare´ recurrence [21, 29, 27] and limit cycles [19].
These systems have formal connections to Hamiltonian dynamics (i.e. energy perserving systems)
[2]. All of these types of recurrent behavior are special cases of chain recurrence [26, 24].
2.2 Online Learning in Discrete Time
In most settings, players update their strategies iteratively in discrete time steps. The most common
class of online learning algorithms is again the family of follow-the-regularized-leader algorithms.
yT1 = y
0
1 +
T−1∑
t=1
Axt2 (Player 1 Payoff Vector)
yT2 = y
0
2 −
T−1∑
t=1
Aᵀxt1 (Player 2 Payoff Vector)
xti = arg max
xi≥0:
∑
j∈[ni] xij=1
{
yti · xi −
hi(xi)
η
}
(FTRL)
xti = arg max
xi≥0:
∑
j∈[ni] xij=1
{
yti · xi −
||xi||22
2η
}
(Gradient Descent)
where η corresponds to the learning rate. In Lemma 6 of Appendix A, we show (FTRL) is the first
order approximation of (Continuous FTRL).
These algorithms again have interesting properties in zero-sum games. The time-average strat-
egy converges to a O(η)-approximate Nash equilibrium [10]. On the contrary, Bailey and Piliouras
show that the day-to-day behavior diverges away from interior Nash equilibria [1]. For notational
simplicity we do not introduce different learning rates η1, η2 but all of our proofs immediately carry
over to this setting.
2.3 Regret in Online Learning
The most common way of analyzing an online learning algorithm is by examining its regret. The
regret at time/iteration T is the difference between the accumulated utility gained by the algorithm
and the total utility of the best fixed action with hindsight. Formally for player 1,
Regret1(T ) = max
x1∈X1
{∫ T
0
x1 ·Ax2(t)dt
}
−
∫ T
0
x1(t) ·Ax2(t)dt (1)
Regret1(T ) = max
x1∈X1
{
T∑
t=0
x1 ·Axt2
}
−
T∑
t=0
xt1 ·Axt2 (2)
for continuous and discrete time respectively.
In the case of (Continuous FTRL) it is possible to show rather strong regret guarantees. Specif-
ically, [21] establishes that Regret1(T ) ∈ O(1) even for non-zero-sum games. In contrast, (FTRL)
only guarantees Regret1(T ) ∈ O(η ·T ) for a fixed learning rate. In this paper, we utilize the geom-
etry of (Gradient Descent) to show Regret1(T ) ∈ O(
√
T ) in 2x2 zero-sum games (n1 = n2 = 2).
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3 The Geometry of Gradient Descent
Theorem 1. Let A be a 2x2 game that has a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium where strategies
are updated according to (Gradient Descent). For any non-equilibrium initial strategies, there exists
a B such that xt is on the boundary for all t ≥ B.
Theorem 1 strengthens the result for (Gradient Descent) in 2x2 games from [1]. Specifically, [1]
show that strategies come arbitrarily close to the boundary infinitely often when updated with any
version of (FTRL). This is accomplished by closely studying the geometry of the player strategies.
We strengthen this result for (Gradient Descent) in 2x2 games by focusing on the geometry of the
payoff vectors. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on many of the tools developed in Section 4 for
Theorem 3 and is deferred to Appendix F.
The first step to understanding the trajectories of the dynamics of (Gradient Descent), is character-
izing the solution to (Gradient Descent). To streamline the discussion and presentation of results,
we defer the proof of Lemma 2 to Appendix B.
Lemma 2. The solution to (Gradient Descent) is given by
xtij =
{
0 for j /∈ Si
η
(
ytij −
∑
k∈Si
ytik
|Si|
)
+ 1|Si| for j ∈ Si
. (3)
where Si is found using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Finding Optimal Set Si
1: procedure Find Si
2: Si ← [ni]
3: Search:
4: Select j ∈ arg mink∈Si{ytik}
5: if η
(
ytij −
∑
k∈Si
ytik
|Si|
)
+ 1|Si| < 0
6: Si ← Si \ {j}
7: goto Search
8: else
9: return Si
3.1 Convex Conjugate of the Regularizer
Our analysis primarily takes place in the space of payoff vectors. The payoff vector yti is a formal
dual of the strategy xti obtained via
h∗(yti) = max
xi≥0:
∑
j∈[ni] xij=1
{
yti · xi −
hi(xi)
η
}
(4)
which is known as the convex conjugate or Fenchel Coupling of hi and is closely related to the
Bregman Divergence. In [21] it is shown that the “energy” r =
∑2
i=1 h
∗
i (y
t
i) is conserved in (Con-
tinuous FTRL). By Lemma 6, (FTRL) is the first order approximation of (Continuous FTRL). The
energy {y : r ≤∑2i=1 h∗i (yi)} is convex, and therefore the energy will be non-decreasing in (FTRL).
[1] capitalized on this non-decreasing energy to show that strategies come arbitrarily close to the
boundary infinitely often in (FTRL).
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In a similar fashion, we precisely compute h∗(yti) to better understand the dynamics of (Gradient
Descent). We deviate slightly from traditional analysis of (FTRL) and embed the learning rate
η into the regularizer hi(x
t
i). Formally, define hi(x
t
i) = ||xti||22/(2η). Through the maximizing
argument [18], we have
h∗i (y
t
i) = y
t
i · xti −
||xti||22
2η
. (5)
From Lemma 2,
yti · xti =
∑
j∈Si
ytij
η
ytij −∑
k∈Si
ytik
|Si|
+ 1|Si|
 (6)
= η
∑
j∈Si
(ytij)
2 − η
∑
j∈Si
∑
k∈Si
ytijy
t
ik
|Si| +
∑
j∈Si
ytij
|Si| (7)
and
||xti||22
2η
=
∑
j∈Si
(
η
(
ytij −
∑
k∈Si
ytik
|Si|
)
+ 1|Si|
)2
2η
(8)
=
η
2
∑
j∈Si
(ytij)
2 − η
∑
j∈Si
∑
k∈Si
ytijy
t
ij
|Si| +
η
2
(∑
j∈Si y
t
ij
)2
|Si| +
1
2η
1
|Si| . (9)
Therefore,
h∗(yti)i = y
t
i · xti −
||xti||22
2η
(10)
=
η
2
∑
j∈Si
(ytij)
2 +
∑
j∈Si
ytij
|Si| −
η
2
(∑
j∈Si y
t
ij
)2
|Si| −
1
2η
1
|Si| . (11)
3.2 Selecting the Right Dual Space in 2x2 Games
Since hi(xi) = ||xi||22/(2η) is a strongly smooth function in the simplex, we expect for h∗i (yi) to be
strongly convex [18] – at least when it’s corresponding dual variable xi is positive. However, (11) is
not strongly convex for all yti ∈ Rni . This is because yt+1i cannot appear anywhere in Rni . Rather,
yt+1i is contained to a space X ∗i dual to the domain {xi ∈ Rni≥0 :
∑ni
j=1 xij = 1}.
There are many non-intersecting dual spaces for the payoff vectors that yield strategies {xti}∞t=1.
[21] informally define a dual space when they focus the analysis on the vector yi(t) − yini(t)1.
Similarly, we define a dual space that will be convenient for showing our results in 2x2 zero-sum
games. Consider the payoff matrix
A =
[
a b
c d
]
(12)
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Without loss of generality, we may assume a > min{0, b, c}, d > min{0, b, c}, and A is singular,
i.e., ad− bc = 0 (see Appendix C for details). Denote ∆yt1 as
∆yt1 = y
t+1
1 − yt1 (13)
= Axt2 (14)
=
[
(a− b)xt21 + b
(c− d)xt21 + d
]
(15)
Therefore
[d− c, a− b] ·∆yt1 = ad− bc = 0 (16)
since A is singular. When yt11 increases by a−b, yt12 increases by c−d. Thus, the vector [a−b, c−d]
describes the span of the dual space X ∗1 . Moreover, (FTRL) is invariant to constant shifts in the
payoff vector yt1 and therefore we may assume [d− c, a− b] · y01 = 0. By induction,
[d− c, a− b] · yt1 = [d− c, a− b] · (yt−11 + ∆yt−11 ) (17)
= [d− c, a− b] · yt−11 = 0 (18)
This conveniently allows us to express yt12 in terms of y
t
11,
yt12 =
c− d
a− by
t
11. (19)
Symmetrically,
yt22 =
b− d
a− cy
t
21. (20)
Combining these relationships with Lemma 2 yields
xt11 =

0 if η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 ≤ 0
1 if η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 ≥ 1
η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 otherwise
(21)
xt21 =

0 if η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 ≤ 0
1 if η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 ≥ 1
η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 otherwise
(22)
The selection of this dual space also allows us to employ a convenient variable substitution to plot
xt and yt on the same graph.
zt1 = η
(
1− c− d
a− b
)
yt11
2
+
1
2
(23)
zt2 = η
(
1− b− d
a− c
)
yt21
2
+
1
2
(24)
The strategy xt can now be expressed as
xti1 =

0 if zti ≤ 0
1 if zti ≥ 1
zti otherwise
(25)
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Moreover, (11) can be rewritten as
h∗i (y
t
1) = h¯
∗
1(z
t
1) =

α10z
t
1 − β10 if zt1 ≤ 0
α11z
t
1 − β11 if zt1 ≥ 1
γ1(z
t
1)
2 + α1z
t
1 − β1 otherwise
(26)
h∗i (y
t
2) = h¯
∗
2(z
t
2) =

α20z
t
2 − β20 if zt2 ≤ 0
α21z
t
2 − β21 if zt2 ≥ 1
γ2(z
t
2)
2 + α2z
t
2 − β2 otherwise
(27)
where αi0 < 0, αi1 > 0, and γi > 0. Both of these expressions are obviously strongly convex when
the corresponding player strategy is in (0, 1). The full details of these reduction can be found in
Appendix D. With this notation, (xt11, x
t
21) is simply the projection of z
t onto the unit square as
shown in Figure 2.
z1
z2
Strategies xt
Payoff Vector zt
z1
z2
(a) Iterations 1-95 (b) Iterations 95-140
Figure 2: Strategies and Transformed Payoff Vectors Rotating Clockwise and Outwards in Matching
Pennies with η = .15 and (y011, y
0
11) = (.2,−.3).
4 Θ(
√
T ) Regret in 2x2 Zero-Sum Games
Theorem 3. Let A be a 2x2 game that has a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium. When xt is
updated according to (Gradient Descent), Regret1(T ) ∈ O
(√
T
)
.
It is well known that if an algorithm admits sublinear regret in zero-sum games, then the
time-average play converges to a Nash equilibirum. Thus, Theorem 3 immediately results in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let A be a 2x2 game that has a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium. When xt
is updated according to (Gradient Descent), average strategy x¯T =
∑T
t=1
xt
T converges to x
NE as
T →∞.
Proof of Theorem 3. The result is simple if x1 = xNE . Neither player strategy will ever change.
Since player 1’s opponent is playing the fully mixed xNE2 , player 1’s utility is constant independent
of what strategy is selected and therefore the regret is always 0. Now consider x1 6= xNE .
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z1
z2
Energy rj increases by Θ(1) per iteration.
There are Θ(1) iterations per rotation.
Energy rj does not change per iteration.
There are Θ(rj) iterations per rotation.
Payoff Vector zt
Strategies xt
Figure 3: Partitioning of Payoff Vectors for the Proof of Theorem 3.
The main details of the proof are captured in Figure 3. Specifically in Section E.1, we establish
break points t0 < t1 < ... < tk = T + 1 and analyze the impact strategies x
tj , xtj+1, ..., xtj+1−1 have
on the regret. The strategies xtj , xtj+1, ..., xtj+1−1 are contained in adjacent red and green sections
as shown in Figure 3.
Next in Section E.2, we show that there exists Θ(1) iterations where xt 6= xt+1 for each parti-
tioning, {tj , tj+1, ..., tj+1−1}. Specifically, we show that Θ(1) consecutive payoff vectors appear in
a red section of Figure 3. The remaining points all appear in a green section and the corresponding
player strategies are equivalent. This implies
tj+1−1∑
t=tj
(xt+11 − xt1) ·Axt2 =
∑
t∈[tj ,tj+1−1]:xt+11 6=xt1
(xt+11 − xt1) ·Axt2 (28)
∈
∑
t∈[tj ,tj+1−1]:xt+11 6=xt1
O(1) (29)
∈ O(1) (30)
Denote rj =
∑t
i=1 h¯
∗
i (z
tj
i ) as the total energy of the system in iteration tj . In Section E.3, we
show this energy increases linearly in each partition, i.e., rj+1 − rj ∈ Θ(1). In Section E.4, we also
show that the size of each partition is proportional to the energy in the system at the beginning
of that partition, i.e., tj+1 − tj ∈ Θ(rj). Combining these two, tj ∈ Θ(j2). Therefore T ∈ Θ(k2)
and k ∈ Θ
(√
T
)
where k is the total number of partitions. Finally, it is well known ([10]) that the
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regret of player 1 in zero-sum games through T iterations is bounded by
Regret1(T ) ≤ O(1) +
T∑
t=0
(xt+11 − xt1) ·Axt2 (31)
≤ O(1) +
t0−1∑
t=0
(xt+11 − xt1) ·Axt2 +
k∑
i=1
ti−1∑
t=ti−1
(xt+11 − xt1) ·Axt2 (32)
∈ O(1) +
k∑
i=1
O(1) (33)
∈ O
(√
T
)
(34)
completing the proof of the theorem.
Next, we provide a game and initial conditions that has regret Θ(
√
T ) establishing that the
bound in Theorem 3 is tight.
Theorem 5. Consider the game Matching Pennies with learning rate η = 1 and initial conditions
y01 = y
0
2 = (1, 0). Then player 1’s regret is Θ(
√
T ) when strategies are updated with (Gradient
Descent).
The proof follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 3 by exactly computing the regret in every
iteration of (Gradient Descent). The full details appear in Section G.
5 Related Work
The study of learning dynamics in game theory has a long history dating back work of [7] and [31]
on fictitious play in zero-sum games, which followed shortly after von Neumann’s seminal work on
zero-sum games ([34, 35]). Some good reference books are the following: [17, 10, 37]. The classic
results about time-average convergence of no-regret dynamics have been successfully generalized to
include multiplayer extensions of network constant-sum games by [15, 9, 8].
Non-equilibrating dynamics in algorithmic game theory. In recent years the algorithmic game
theory community has produced several interesting non-equilibrium results. These proofs are typi-
cally based on ad-hoc techniques, and results in this area typically revolve around specific examples
of games with a handful of agents and strategies. [13] show that multiplicative weights update
(MWU) does not converge even in a time-average sense in the case of a specific 3x3 game. [19] es-
tablish non-convergence for a continuous-time variant of MWU, known as the replicator dynamic,
for a 2x2x2 game and show that as a result the system social welfare converges to states that
dominate all Nash equilibria. [25, 11] prove the existence of Li-Yorke chaos in MWU dynamics of
2x2 potential games. Our result add a new chapter in this area with new detailed understanding
of the non-equilibrium trajectories of gradient descent in two-by-two zero-sum games and their
implications to regret.
Connections to continuous time dynamics in game theory. From the perspective of evolutionary
game theory, which typically studies continuous time dynamics, numerous nonconvergence results
are known but again typically for small games, e.g., [32]. [29] and [27] show that replicator dynamics,
the continuous time version of MWU exhibit a specific type of near periodic behavior, which is
known as Poincare´ recurrence. Recently, [21] show how to generalize this recurrent behavior for
replicator to more general continuous time variants of FTRL dynamics. [20] show that these
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arguments can also be adapted in the case of dynamically evolving games. Cycles arise also in
team competition ([28]) as well as in network competition ([23]). The papers in this category
combine delicate arguments such as volume preservation and the existence of constants of motions
(“energy preservation”) for the dynamics to establish cyclic behavior. In the case of discrete time
dynamics, such as the multiplicative weights or gradient descent, the system trajectories are first
order approximations of the above motion and these conservation arguments are no longer valid.
Instead as we have seen in this paper the “energy” is not preserved but increases over time at a
predictable rate that allows us to prove tight bounds on the regret. Finally, [26] have put forward
a program for linking game theory and topology of dynamical systems.
Fast regret minimization in games. It is widely known that the “black-box” average regret rate of
O(1/
√
t) it is achieved by MWU with suitably shrinking step size without making any assumptions
about its environment. Recently, several authors have focused instead on obtaining stronger regret
guarantees for systems of learning algorithms in games. [12] and [30] develop no-regret dynamics
with a O(log t/t) regret minimization rate when played against each other in two-player zero-sum
games. [33] further analyze a recency biased variant of FTRL in more general games and showed a
O(t−3/4) regret minimization rate. The social welfare converges at a rate of O(t−1), a result which
was extended to standard versions of FRTL dynamics by [16].
Learning in zero-sum games and applications to Artificial Intelligence. A stream of recent
papers proves positive results about convergence to equilibria in (mostly bilinear) zero-sum games
for suitable adapted variants of first-order methods and then apply these techniques to Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs), showing improved performance (e.g. [14]) [4] exploit conservation
laws of learning dynamics in zero-sum games (e.g. [29, 21]) to develop new algorithms for training
GANs that add a new component to the dynamic that aims at minimizing this energy function.
Different energy shrinking techniques for convergence in GANs (non-convex saddle point problems)
exploit connections to variational inequalities and employ mirror descent techniques with an extra
gradient step ([22]). Game theoretic inspired techniques such as time-averaging seem to work well
in practice for a wide range of architectures ([36]).
Finally, the emergence of cycles in zero-sum competition lies at the core of some of the most
exciting problems in creating artificial agents for complex environments such as Starcraft, where
even evaluating the strength of an individual agent is a non-trivial task ([5]). Recent approaches
are inspired by the emergence of cyclic behavior to introduce algorithms that aim at game-theoretic
niching ([3]).
6 Conclusion
We present the first, to our knowledge, proof of sublinear regret for the most classic FTRL dynamic,
online gradient descent, in two-by-two zero-sum games. Our proof techniques leverage geometric
information and hinge upon the fact that FTRL dynamics, although are typically referred to as
“converging” to Nash equilibria in zero-sum games, diverge away from them. We strongly believe
that these techniques, which we are just introducing, are far from being fully mined. Although
several novel ideas will be required, we are fairly confident that these sublinear regret bounds carry
over to much more general classes of FTRL dynamics as well as to large (zero-sum) games.
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A First Order Approximation of (Continuous FTRL)
Lemma 6. (FTRL) is the first order approximation of (Continuous FTRL).
Proof. The first order approximation of y1(t) is
yˆ1(t) = y1(t− 1) + d
dt
y1(t− 1) (35)
= y1(t− 1) +Ax1(t− 1) (36)
and
xˆ1(t) = arg max
x1∈X1
{
x · yˆ1(t)− h1(x1)
η
}
(37)
Inductively, yˆ1(t) = y
t
1 and xˆ1(t) = x
t
1 as defined in (FTRL) completing the proof of the lemma.
B Optimal Solution to (Gradient Descent)
The KKT optimality conditions (see [6]) for (Gradient Descent) are given by
xti = η
(
yti − λti · 1+ uti
)
(Critical Point)
xti ≥ 0 (Non-negativity)
ni∑
j=1
xtij = 1 (Primal Feasibility)
uti ≥ 0 (Dual Feasibility)
uti · xti = 0 (Complimentary Slackness)
where uti ∈ Rni and λti ∈ R.
Let Si be the set of j where u
t
ij = 0. By (Complimentary Slackness), x
t
ij = 0 for all j /∈ Si.
Therefore, (Critical Point) becomes
xtij =
{
0 for j /∈ Si
η(ytij − λti) for j ∈ Si
. (38)
Substituting (38) into (Primal Feasibility) yields
1 =
ni∑
j=1
xtij (39)
=
∑
j∈Si
η(ytij − λti) (40)
and λti =
∑
j∈Si y
t
ij/|Si| − 1/(η|Si|). Therefore
xtij =
{
0 for j /∈ Si
η
(
ytij −
∑
k∈Si
ytik
|Si|
)
+ 1|Si| for j ∈ Si
. (41)
The variable utij = 0 represents that the constraint x
t
ij is unenforced. Enforcing constraints
never improves the objective value of an optimization problem and therefore Si ⊆ [ni] is a maximal
set where (41) is feasible. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if ytij ≥ ytik then xtij ≥ xtik.
Thus, greedily removing the lowest valued ytij from Sˆi = [ni] until (41) is feasible yields the optimal
solution to (Gradient Descent).
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C Payoff Matrix Assumptions
The payoff matrix is in the form
A =
[
a b
c d
]
(42)
In this paper, we make three assumptions about A: ad − bc = 0, a > max{0, b, c} and d >
max{0, b, c}. In order, we show that we may make these assumption without loss of generality.
In 2x2 games, if there is a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium, then it is straight forward to
show that player 2’s equilibrium is
xNE2 =
(
d− b
a+ d− b− c ,
a− c
a+ d− b− c
)
(43)
and therefore a + d − b − c 6= 0, d 6= b and a 6= c when there is a unique fully mixed Nash
equilibrium. Similarly, by analyzing player 1’s Nash equilibrium, d 6= c and a 6= b. Now consider
the payoff matrix
B =
[
a+ ad−bca+d−b−c b+
ad−bc
a+d−b−c
c+ ad−bca+d−b−c d+
ad−bc
a+d−b−c
]
(44)
The determinant of payoff matrix B is zero. Moreover, (FTRL) is invariant to shifts in the payoff
matrix, so for the purpose of the dynamics {xt}∞t=1, A and B are equivalent matrices. Thus, without
loss of generality we may assume the payoff matrix is singular by shifting the matrix by a specific
constant.
Next, we argue that we may assume a > 0. Players 1 and 2 separately try to solve
max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
x1 ·
[
a b
c d
]
x2 = max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
−x1 ·
[ −a −b
−c −d
]
x2 (45)
= − max
x2∈X2
min
x1∈X1
x2 ·
[ −a −c
−b −d
]
x1. (46)
Thus, by possibly switching the maximization and minimization roles between player 1 and player
2, we may assume a > 0.
Next we show that we may assume a > max{b, c}. If a+ d− b− c > 0 then (43) implies a > c
and, symmetrically, a > b completing the claim. If instead, a+d− b− c < 0, then through identical
reasoning, min{b, c} > a > 0 and we can simply rewrite the payoff matrix as
max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
x1 ·
[
a b
c d
]
x2 = max
x1∈X1
min
x2∈X2
x1 ·
[
b a
d c
]
x2 (47)
With the new payoff matrix, b + c − a − d > 0 implying b > max{a, d} ≥ 0 as desired. Thus, we
may assume a > max{0, b, c} by relabeling player 1’s strategies.
Finally, ad − bc = 0 and a > max{0, b, c} implies d > max{0, b, c}. The prior analysis argues
a + d − b − c > 0. Thus, (43) implies d > max{b, c}. Now for contradiction, suppose d < 0. This
implies 0 > d > max{b, c} and ad− bc < 0 a contradiction. Therefore d > max{0, b, c}.
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D Expressing the Convex Conjugate with the Transformed Pay-
offs
We can express x as
xt11 =

0 if η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 ≤ 0
1 if η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 ≥ 1
η
(
1− c−da−b
)
yt11
2 +
1
2 otherwise
(48)
xt21 =

0 if η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 ≤ 0
1 if η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 ≥ 1
η
(
1− b−da−c
)
yt21
2 +
1
2 otherwise.
. (49)
Thus, (11) simplifies to
h∗1(y
t
1) =

yt12 − 12η if xt11 = 0
yt11 − 12η if xt11 = 1
η
4
(
yt11 − yt12
)2
+
yt11+y
t
12
η − 14η otherwise
(50)
=

c−d
a−by
t
11 − 12η if xt11 = 0
yt11 − 12η if xt11 = 1
η
4
(
1− c−da−b
)2 (
yt11
)2
+
(1− c−da−b)yt11
η − 14η otherwise
(51)
Symmetrically,
h∗2(y
t
2) =

b−d
a−cy
t
21 − 12η if xt21 = 0
yt21 − 12η if xt21 = 1
η
4
(
1− b−da−c
)2 (
yt21
)2
+
(1− b−da−c)yt21
η − 14η otherwise
(52)
Unlike (11), we can easily verify h∗ is strongly convex when the strategy is fully mixed. In addition
to allowing for a simpler analysis,
h∗1(y
t
1) =

c−d
a−by
t
11 − 12η if xt11 = 0
yt11 − 12η if xt11 = 1
η
4
(
1− c−da−b
)2 (
yt11
)2
+
(1− c−da−b)yt11
η − 14η otherwise
(53)
=

α10z
t
1 − β10 if zt1 ≤ 0
α11z
t
1 − β11 if zt1 ≥ 1
γ1(z
t
1)
2 + α1z
t
1 − β1 otherwise
(54)
= h¯∗1(z
t
1) (55)
where α10 < 0, α11 > 0, and γ1 > 0. Symmetrically,
h¯∗2(z
t
2) =

α20z
t
2 − β20 if zt2 ≤ 0
α21z
t
2 − β21 if zt2 ≥ 1
γ2(z
t
2)
2 + α2z
t
2 − β2 otherwise
(56)
with α20 < 0, α21 > 0, and γ2 > 0.
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E Details of Theorem 3
E.1 Partitioning the Strategies and the Dual Space
By assumption a > min{0, b, c} and d > min{0, b, c} (See Appendix C). This implies that both
the strategies (x11, x21) and the transformed payoff vector z will rotate clockwise about the Nash
equilibrium in both continuous and discrete time as depicted in Figure 2. To formally show clockwise
movement, assume xt11 ≥ xNE11 , xt21 ≥ xNE21 (upper right of the Nash equilibrium). Then xt1 ·Axt2 ≤
(1, 0) · Axt2 implying xt11 ≤ xt+111 . Symmetrically, xt21 ≥ xt+122 implying that if xt11 ≥ xNE11 and
xt21 ≥ xNE21 then the strategies move clockwise or not at all. Similarly, clockwise movement can be
shown for the other three cases. A symmetric argument shows the transformed payoff vector z also
rotates clockwise.
To partition the strategies {xt}Tt=1, we begin by first partitioning the dual space X∗ into 4
regions Z0, Z1, Z2, and Z3. The visual representation of this partitioning is given in Figure 4.
Z0 = {z : z1 < 1, z2 ≥ 1} .
Z1 = {z : z1 ≥ 1, z2 > 0} .
Z2 = {z : z1 > 0, z2 ≤ 0} .
Z3 = {z : z1 ≤ 0, z2 < 1} .
The partitioning Z0, Z1, Z2, and Z3, is not a proper partitioning. As depicted in Figure 4,
it lacks all payoff vectors that correspond to fully mixed strategies for both players. However, by
Theorem 1, there exists a B so that xt is not fully mixed for both players for all t ≥ B. Since B is
finite, the first B strategies will shift the total regret by at most a constant and therefore can be
disregarded in our analysis.
z1
z2
fully mixed
strategies
Z0
Z1
Z2
Z3
Figure 4: Visual Representation of Z0, Z1, Z2 and Z3.
Since strategies move clockwise, in general the payoff vectors will move from region Zi to region
Z(i+1 mod 4). If η is large, then it is possible to move directly from Zi to Z(i+2 mod 4). While we
consider such η impractical, our analysis handles such cases and shows that after enough iterations,
the payoff vectors never skip a region. Finally, we are able to define our partitioning over {xt}Tt=1.
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Let B be as in the statement of Theorem 1 and let Z(t) ∈ {Z0, Z1, Z2, Z3} be such that zt ∈ Z(t).
t0 = arg min
t≥B
{zt ∈ Z0} (57)
tj = arg min
t≥tj−1
{zt /∈ Z(t− 1)} ∀j = 1, 2, ... (58)
Finally, let tk = T + 1 where k − 1 is the largest index that has a solution in (58). The value
tj represents the first time after tj−1 that zt enters a new region. Our analysis now focuses on
the time intervals created by these break points. Specifically, we analyze xtj , xtj+1, ..., xtj+1−1 and
ztj , ztj+1, ..., ztj+1−1
E.2 Player Strategies Often Do Not Change
In this section, we show that for each partitioning {tj , ..., tj+1 − 1} the strategies change at most
a constant, κ, of times independent of the size of the partitioning, tj+1 − tj . This result is useful
in two areas. First, in the proof of Theorem 3 it is used to show that xtj , ..., xtj+1−1 contributes
to the regret by an amount proportional to κ. Second, it is used in the proof of Lemma 8 to show
the total energy in the system increases by a constant in each partition; we show the energy only
increases when the player strategies change and therefore, the energy increases at most κ times in
each partition.
Lemma 7. There exists a κ such that |{t ∈ {tj , ..., tj+1 − 1} : xt 6= xt+1}| ≤ κ for all j.
Proof of Lemma 7. Without loss of generality, assume ztj , ..., ztj+1−1 ∈ Z1. This implies xtj11 = ... =
x
tj+1−1
11 = 1 and therefore
yt+121 − yt21 = [−a,−c] · [xt11, 1− xt11] (59)
= −a (60)
for all t = tj , ..., tj+1 − 1. Thus, there must exist a constant δ1 > 0 such that zt2 − zt+12 = δ1.
By selection of Z1, z
t
2 > 0 for all t. Moreover, x
t
21 = 1 if z
t
2 ≥ 1. Since zt2 decreases by δ1
in each iteration, xt21 6= xt+121 iff zt+12 < 1. However, since zt2 − zt+12 = δ1, there can only be at
most κ1 = d1/δ1e such t. For regions Z0, Z2, and Z3, there exist similar κ0, κ2, and κ3. Taking
κ = max{κ0, κ1, κ2, κ3} completes the proof of the lemma.
E.3 Energy Increases by Θ(1) in Each Partition
Next, we show the energy in the system increases by a constant each time zt moves into a new
partition. Again, we use this result in two places. First, we use the result in the proof of Lemma 9,
to show that zt moves from Zi directly to Z(i+2 mod 4) at most a constant number of times. Second,
we use the result in combination with Lemma 9 to show tj ∈ Θ(j2) allowing us to conclude that
k ∈ Θ(√T ) partitions are visited in T iterations.
Lemma 8. rj+1 − rj ∈ Θ(1).
The proof of Lemma 8 relies on the observation that (Gradient Descent) is simply a 1st order
approximation of (Continuous Gradient Descent) as depicted in Figure 5. When neither zti /∈ (0, 1),
the continuous time dynamics move in a straight line and therefore a 1st order approximation
perfectly preserves the energy of the system. However, if zti ∈ (0, 1) then by the strong convexity
of h¯i(z
t
i), the total energy of the system increases. By Lemma 7, there are a constant number
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z2
z1
Continuous Time Dynamics
Discrete Time Dynamics
Figure 5: Discrete Time is a 1st Order Approximation of Continuous Time.
of t where zti ∈ (0, 1) for each partition and therefore the total energy increases by O(1) in each
partition.
For the proof of Lemma 8 is is useful to recall the following from Section 3.2:
h¯∗1(z
t
1) =

α10z
t
1 − β10 if zt1 ≤ 0
α11z
t
1 − β11 if zt1 ≥ 1
γ1(z
t
1)
2 + α1z
t
1 − β1 otherwise
(61)
h¯∗2(z
t
2) =

α20z
t
2 − β20 if zt2 ≤ 0
α21z
t
2 − β21 if zt2 ≥ 1
γ2(z
t
2)
2 + α2z
t
2 − β2 otherwise
(62)
where αi0 < 0, αi1 > 0, and γi > 0.
Proof of Lemma 8. Without loss of generality assume ztj , ..., ztj+1−1 ∈ Z1. Once again by selection
of Z1, z
t
2 > 0 and x
t
11 = 1 implying z
t
1 ≥ 1 for all t = tj , ..., tj+1 − 1. Let Rt =
∑2
i=1 h¯
∗
i (z
t
i) be the
total energy in the system in iteration t. By [21], the continuous time dynamics are captured by
{z : ∑2i=1 h∗i (zi) = R} around the point zt. When zt1 ≥ 1, the continuous time dynamics around zt
are captured by
Rt =
2∑
i=1
h¯∗i (zi) (63)
= h¯∗2(z2) + α11z1 − β11 (64)
reducing to
z1 =
Rt + β11 − h¯∗2(z2)
α11
. (65)
As observed earlier, (Gradient Descent) is simply a 1st order approximation of (Continuous Gradient
Descent) and therefore
zt+11 = z
t
1 −
∇h¯∗2(zt2)
α11
(zt+12 − zt2) (66)
= zt1 +
∇h¯∗2(zt2)
α11
δ1 (67)
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where δ1 = z
t
2 − zt+12 is shown to be constant in the proof of Lemma 7. We now examine the five
possible locations for zt2 and z
t+1
2 .
Case 1: zt2 ≥ 1, zt+12 ≥ 1. We show there is no change to the energy in the system. Since
zt2 ≥ 1,
zt+11 = z
t
1 +
∇h¯∗2(zt2)
α11
δ1 (68)
= zt1 +
α21
α11
δ1 (69)
The total energy in iteration t+ 1 is given by
Rt+1 =
2∑
i=1
h¯∗i (z
t+1
i ) (70)
= α11z
t+1
1 − β11 + α21zt+12 − β21 (71)
= α11
(
zt1 +
α21
α11
δ1
)
− β11 + α21(zt2 − δ1)− β21 (72)
= α11z
t
1 − β11 + α21zt2 − β21 (73)
=
2∑
i=1
h¯∗i (z
t
i) = R
t (74)
and the energy in the system remains unchanged.
Case 2: zt2 ∈ (0, 1), zt+12 ∈ (0, 1). We show the energy increases by at least γ2δ21 . We begin
with writing z(δ) as
z1(δ) = z
t
1 +
∇h¯∗2(zt2)
α11
δ (75)
= zt1 +
2γ2z
t
2 + α2
α11
δ1 (76)
z2(δ) = z
t
2 − δ (77)
Therefore, zt+1 = z(δ1). Similarly, let R(δ) be energy associated with the point z(δ). Formally,
R(δ) =
2∑
i=1
h¯∗i (z
t+1
i (δ)) (78)
= α11z
t+1
1 (δ)− β11 + γ2(zt+12 (δ))2 + α2z2(δ)− β2 (79)
= α11
(
zt1 +
2γ2z
t
2 + α2
α11
δ
)
− β11 + γ2(zt2 − δ)2 + α2(zt2 − δ)− β2 (80)
and R(δ1) = R
t+1 and R(0) = Rt. Moreover d
2R
dδ2
= 2γ2 > 0 and therefore R(δ) is strongly convex
with parameter 2γ2. Thus,
Rt+1 = R(δ1) ≥ R(0) +R′(0) + γ2δ21 (81)
= Rt + γ2δ
2
1 (82)
and the energy increases by at least γ2δ
2
1 completing Case 2.
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Case 3: zt2 ≥ 1, zt+12 ∈ (0, 1). The energy increases by at least γ2(1− zt+12 )2. This case follows
identically to Case 2 by approximating R(δ1) using strong convexity and R(z
t
2 − 1).
Case 4: zt2 ∈ (0, 1), zt+12 ≤ 0. The energy increases by at least γ2(zt2)2. This case follows
similarly to Cases 2 and 3.
Case 5: zt2 ≥ 1, zt+12 ≤ 0. The energy increases by at least γ2. This case follows similarly to
Cases 2-4.
We now can compute rj+1 − rj . In each case, the increase in energy is bounded above since
zt2−zt+12 is bounded. Let Ck be the number of times that Case k occurs. Case 1 results in no change
to the energy. By Lemma 7, Case 2 occurs at most κ1 times. Since z
t
2 is decreasing, Cases 3, 4,
and 5 can occur at most once each. Therefore rj+1− rj ∈
∑5
k=2Ck ·O(1) ≤ (κ1 + 3) ·O(1) ∈ O(1).
It remains to show rj+1 − rj ∈ Ω(1).
First suppose Case 2 occurs at least once, then immediately we have rj+1 − rj ≥ γδ21 ∈ Ω(1).
If Case 2 does not occur, then either Cases 3 and 4 occur, or Case 5 occurs. If Case 5 occurs
then rj+1 − rj ≥ γ2 ∈ Ω(1) If Cases 3 and 4 occur but Case 2 does not, only one t is such that
zt2 ∈ (0, 1). Thus, rj+1 − rj ≥ minz2∈(0,1){γ2(z2)2 + γ2(1 − z2)2} = γ22 ∈ Ω(1). In all possibilities,
rj+1 − rj ∈ Ω(1) completing the proof of the lemma.
E.4 The Steps Per Partition are Proportional to the Energy
In this section, we show that the number of steps in a partition is proportional to the total energy
in the system. We establish this by leveraging the connection between (Continuous Gradient
Descent) and (Gradient Descent). Lemma 9 is used in conjunction with Lemma 8 to show a
quadratic relationship between the total number of iterations and the number of partitions that
the strategies have passed through. This quadratic relationship directly leads to the O(
√
T ) regret
bound in Theorem 3.
Lemma 9. tj+1 − tj ∈ Θ(rj).
Proof of Lemma 9. Without loss of generality, assume ztj , ..., ztj+1−1 ∈ Z1. As in the proof of
Lemma 7, there exists a constant δ1 > 0 such that z
t
2 − zt+12 = δ1 for all t = tj , ..., tj+1 − 1. This
implies δ1(tj+1−tj) = ztj2 −ztj+12 . Thus, to prove Lemma 9 it suffices to show ztj2 −ztj+12 ∈ Θ(rj). By
definition of tj+1, z
tj+1−1
2 ∈ Z1 and therefore 0 ≥ ztj+12 = ztj+1−12 −δ ≥ −δ. Thus, ztj2 −ztj+12 ∈ Θ(rj)
if and only if z
tj
2 ∈ Θ(rj).
To show z
tj
2 ∈ Θ(rj) and complete the proof, we break the problem into 6 cases based on the
location of ztj−1 as depicted in Figure 6. The analyses for Cases 1-3 are similar and we show Cases
4-6 can never occur.
Case 1: Let Rtj−1 be the energy at time tj−1. Let M0 = {z : z ∈ Z0, z1 ∈ [0, 1],
∑2
i=1 h¯
∗
i (zi) =
Rtj−1}. By definition, ztj−1 ∈M0. Observe for z ∈M0,
Rtj−1 =
2∑
i=1
h¯∗i (zi) (83)
= γ1(z1)
2 + α1z1 − β1 + α21z2 − β21 (84)
and therefore
z2 =
Rtj−1 − γ1(z1)2 − α1z1 + β1 + β21
α21
(85)
22
z1
z2
fully mixed
strategies
Z0
Z1
Z2
Z3
Case 1Case 2
Case 3
Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
z2 = 1
Figure 6: Cases for Lemma 9.
which is a concave function and therefore minimized at z1 = 0 or z1 = 1. Thus,
z
tj−1
2 ≥ min
z1∈{0,1}
Rtj−1 − γ1(z1)2 − α1z1 + β1 + β21
α21
∈ Θ(Rtj−1). (86)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 8, we compute z
tj
2 from z
tj−1
2 :
z
tj
2 = z
tj−1
2 −
∇h¯∗1(ztj−11 )
α21
(z
tj
1 − ztj−11 ) (87)
= z
tj−1
2 −
2γ1z
tj−1
1 − α1
α21
δ0 (88)
∈ ztj−12 + Θ(1) ∈ Θ(Rtj−1) (89)
since z
tj−1
1 ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, by Lemma 8, rj−1 ≤ Rtj−1 ≤ rj = rj−1+Θ(1) and therefore ztj2 ∈ Θ(rj)
completing Case 1.
Case 2: This case follows identically to Case 1 using ∇h¯∗1(ztj−11 ) = α10.
Case 3: Similar to the proof of Case 1, z
tj−1
1 ∈ −Θ(Rtj−1) and ztj1 = ztj−11 + Θ(1). However,
since ztj ∈ Z1, ztj1 ≥ 1 implying Rtj−1 ∈ Θ(1). Therefore, by Lemma 8, rj ∈ Θ(1). Let δ3 > 0 be as
in the proof of Lemma 8. Since ztj−1 ∈ Z3 and ztj−12 ∈ [0, 1], ztj2 = ztj−12 +δ3 and ztj2 ∈ Θ(1) = Θ(rj)
completing Case 3.
Case 4, 5 and 6: In Case 4, the sign of ∇h¯∗2(ztj−12 ) implies ztj1 < ztj−11 < 0. In Case 5,
z
tj
1 = z
tj−1
1 − δ2 < 1 where δ2 > 0 is defined in the proof of Lemma 8. In Case 6, the sign of
∇h¯∗1(ztj−11 ) implies ztj2 < ztj−12 < 0. All three cases contradict that ztj1 ∈ Z1 completing Cases 4, 5,
and 6.
In all 6 cases, z
tj
2 ∈ Θ(rj) implying tj+1 − tj ∈ Θ(rj) completing the proof.
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F Convergence to the Boundary
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of convergence to the boundary follows similarly to the details for
Theorem 3. By [1], there exists a constant w > 0 and a T such that mini∈{1,2}{|xti1−xNEi1 |} ≥ w for
all t ≥ T . Similar to Theorem 3, we can then partition the dual space around the Nash equilibrium
as follows:
Z0 =
{
z : z1 < x
NE
11 + w, z2 ≥ xNE22 + w
}
.
Z1 =
{
z : z1 ≥ xNE11 + w, z2 > xNE22 − w
}
.
Z2 =
{
z : z1 > x
NE
11 − w, z2 ≤ xNE22 − w
}
.
Z3 =
{
z : z1 ≤ xNE11 − w, z2 < xNE22 + w
}
.
xNE
z1
z2
w
z2 = 1
Z0
Z1
Z2
Z3
Figure 7: Partitioning for Theorem 1.
Once again the strategies rotate clockwise when updated with (Gradient Descent). Similar to
Lemma 8, the energy increases by at least a constant in each iteration. By continuity of h¯∗i and
compactness, the energy
∑2
i=1 h¯
∗
i (zi) is bounded above by u when z ∈ [0, 1]2. Similar to Lemma 9,
zt spends a bounded number of steps in a partition before moving onto the next partition. Since
energy is increasing by a constant each time zt enters a new partition, there must exist an iteration
B when the energy exceeds u. Thus, for all t ≥ B, zt /∈ [0, 1]2 implying xt is on the boundary.
G Proof of Theorem 5
In this section, we establish that the worst-case regret is exactly Θ(
√
T ). To establish this result,
it remains to provide a game, learning rate, and initial condition y0 where the regret is Ω(
√
T ).
To establish this lower bound, we first express iteration t uniquely with t = n(n+1)2 + k for some
k ∈ {0, ..., n}. Using notation, we provide the exact position of the payoff vector, yti in each iteration.
With this position, we compute the exact utility and regret through iteration t. Specifically, we
show that in iteration n(n+1)2 + k, the total regret is
n
2 + O(1). To show these results, we use the
game Matching Pennies with learning rate η = 1 and initial payoff vectors y01 = y
0
2 = (1, 0).
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(
1 −1
−1 1
)
(Matching Pennies Payoff Matrix)
Lemma 10. Consider the game Matching Pennies with learning rate η = 1 and initial conditions
y01 = y
0
2 = (1, 0). In iteration t =
n(n+1)
2 + k where k ∈ {0, ..., n}, player i’s payoff vector is given
by
y
n(n+1)
2
+k
1 =

(1 + k,−k) if n ≡ 0 mod 4
(1 + n− k,−n+ k) if n ≡ 1 mod 4
(−k, 1 + k) if n ≡ 2 mod 4
(−n+ k, 1 + n− k) if n ≡ 3 mod 4
y
n(n+1)
2
+k
2 =

(1 + n− k,−n+ k) if n ≡ 0 mod 4
(−k, 1 + k) if n ≡ 1 mod 4
(−n+ k, 1 + n− k) if n ≡ 2 mod 4
(1 + k,−k) if n ≡ 3 mod 4
.
Proof. The result trivially holds for the base case t = n = k = 0. We now proceed by induction
and assume the results holds for t = n(n+1)2 + k and show the result holds for t+ 1. We break the
problem into four cases based on the remainder of n/4.
Case 1: n ≡ 0 mod 4. By the inductive hypothesis, yt1 = (1+k,−k) and yt2 = (1+n−k,−n+k).
Since k ≤ n, yt11 ≥ 1 and yt21 ≥ 1. Following similarly to Section 3.2,
xti1 =

1 if yti1 ≥ 1
0 if yti1 ≤ 0
yti1 otherwise
. (90)
Thus, xt1 = x
t
2 = (1, 0) implying
yt+11 = y
t
1 +Ax
t
2 (91)
= yt1 + (1,−1) (92)
= (1 + k,−k) + (1,−1), (93)
yt+12 = y
t
2 −Aᵀxt1 (94)
= yt2 + (−1, 1) (95)
= (1 + n− k,−n+ k) + (−1, 1). (96)
If k < n, then t+1 = n(n+1)2 +[k+1] and y
t+1
1 = (1+[k+1],−[k+1]) and yt+12 = (1+n−[k+1],−n+
[k + 1]) as predicted by the statement of the lemma. If instead k = n, then t + 1 = [n+1]([n+1]+1)2
where [n + 1] ≡ 1 mod 4. Moreover, yt+11 = (1 + k + 1,−k − 1) = ([n + 1] + 1,−[n + 1]) and
yt+12 = (1 + n − k − 1,−n + k + 1) = (0, 1) again matching the statement of lemma. Thus, the
inductive step holds for all values of k when n ≡ 0 mod 4.
Case 2: n ≡ 1 mod 4. Since k ∈ [0, n], yt11 ≥ 1 and yt21 ≤ 0. Following identically to Case 1,
yt+11 = (1 + n − k − 1,−n + k + 1) and yt+12 = (−k − 1, 1 + k + 1) matching the statement of the
lemma for all possible values of k.
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Case 3: n ≡ 2 mod 4. Since k ∈ [0, n], yt11 ≤ 0 and yt21 ≤ 0. Following identically to the
previous cases, yt+11 = (−k − 1, 1 + k + 1) and yt+12 = (−n + k + 1, 1 + n − k − 1) matching the
statement of the lemma for all possible values of k.
Case 4: n ≡ 3 mod 4. Since k ∈ [0, n], yt11 ≤ 0 and yt21 ≥ 0. Following identically to the
previous cases, yt+11 = (−n + k + 1, 1 + n − k − 1) and yt+12 = (1 + k + 1,−k − 1) matching the
statement of the lemma for all possible values of k.
In all four cases, the inductive hypothesis holds completing the proof of the lemma.
With the exact value of the payoff vector in each iteration, we can compute the cumulative
utility.
Lemma 11. Consider the game Matching Pennies with learning rate η = 1 and initial conditions
y01 = y
0
2 = (1, 0). In iteration t =
n(n+1)
2 + k where k ∈ {0, ..., n}, player 1’s cumulative utility is
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 =
{
1− n2 + k if n ≡ 0 mod 2
n−1
2 − k if n ≡ 1 mod 2
.
Proof. We again proceed by induction. The base case t = n = k = 0 trivially holds. We assume
the result holds for t = n(n+1)2 + k and show it holds for t + 1. Again, we break the problem into
four cases based on the remainder of n/4.
Case 1: n ≡ 0 mod 4. First, we consider k < n. Since k < n, t+1 is in the form n(n+1)2 +[k+1]
where k + 1 ≤ n. Thus, by Lemma 10, yt+111 = 1 + [k + 1] ≥ 1 and yt+121 = 1 + n − [k + 1] ≥ 1
implying xt+11 = x
t+1
2 = (1, 0). therefore,
t+1∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = xt+11 ·Axt+12 +
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = 1 + 1−
n
2
+ k = 1− n
2
+ [k + 1]. (97)
This completes Case 1 when k < n.
If instead k = n, then t is in the form [n+1]([n+1]+1)2 where [n+1] ≡ 1 mod 4. Similar to before,
yt+111 = 1 + n ≥ 1 and yt+121 = 0 implying xt+11 = (1, 0) and xt+12 = (0, 1). Therefore,
t+1∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = xt+11 ·Axt+12 +
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = −1 + 1−
n
2
+ n =
[n+ 1]− 1
2
. (98)
This completes Case 1 when k = n. Thus the inductive hypothesis holds in Case 1.
Case 2: n ≡ 2 mod 4. This case holds similarly to Case 1. The only difference is that
xt+11 = x
t+1
2 = (0, 1) when k < n and x
t+1
2 = (1, 0) when k = n which does not change the value of
xt+11 ·Axt+12 .
Case 3: n ≡ 1 mod 4. First consider k < n implying t+ 1 is in the form n(n−1)2 + [k+ 1] where
k + 1 ≤ n. Similar to Case 1, xt+11 = (1, 0) and xt+12 = (0, 1). This implies
t+1∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = xt+11 ·Axt+12 +
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = −1 +
n− 1
2
− k = n− 1
2
− [k + 1]. (99)
completing Case 3 when k < n.
If instead k = n, then t is in the form [n+1]([n+1]+1)2 where [n + 1] ≡ 2 mod 4. This implies
xt+11 = (0, 1) and x
t+1
2 = (0, 1). Therefore,
t+1∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = xt+11 ·Axt+12 +
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 = 1 +
n− 1
2
− n = 1− [n+ 1]
2
, (100)
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matching the statement of the lemma. This completes Case 3.
Case 4: n ≡ 3 mod 4. Case 4 follows from Case 3 in the same way that Case 2 follows from
Case 1. The hypothesis holds under all cases completing the proof of the lemma.
We now show that Matching Pennies with learning rate η1 and initial conditions y
0
1 = y
0
2 = (1, 0)
has regret Θ(
√
T ) when updated with (Gradient Descent).
Proof of Theorem 5. Theorem 3 establishes that the regret is O(
√
T ). To show that the regret is
Ω(
√
T ), we show that in iteration t = n(n+1)2 + k, that player 1’s regret is
n
2 +O(1) completing the
proof.
The total regret through iteration t is given by
max
x1∈X1
x1 ·
t∑
t=0
Axs2 = max
x1∈X1
x1 · (yt+11 − y0) (101)
= |yt+111 − 1| (102)
since yt11 − 1 = yt12 for all t by Lemma 10.
If k < n, then t+ 1 = n(n−1)2 + [k + 1] and
|yt+111 | −
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 =

[k + 1]− (1− n2 + k) = n2 if n ≡ 0 mod 4
n− [k + 1]− (n−12 − k) = n−12 if n ≡ 1 mod 4
[k + 1] + 1− (1− n2 + k) = n2 + 1 if n ≡ 2 mod 4
n− [k + 1] + 1− (n−12 − k) = n+12 if n ≡ 3 mod 4
. (103)
If k = n, then t+ 1 = [n+1]([n+1]−1)2 and
|yt+111 | −
t∑
s=0
xs1 ·Axs2 =

[n+ 1]− (1− n2 + n) = n2 if n ≡ 0 mod 4
1− (n−12 − n) = n+32 if n ≡ 1 mod 4
[n+ 1] + 1− (1− n2 + n) = n2 + 1 if n ≡ 2 mod 4
0− (n−12 − n) = n+12 if n ≡ 3 mod 4
. (104)
In all cases, the total regret is n2 +O(1) ∈ Ω(
√
t) completing the proof of the theorem.
27
